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ABSTRACT 
EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION AND FIRM 
RELOCATION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE* 
Gerda Dewit, Holger Görg and Yama Temouri 
We examine the determinants of the decision to relocate activities abroad for firms located in 
OECD countries.  We argue that particular firm-specific features play a crucial role for the link 
between employment protection and relocation. Stricter employment protection laws in the 
current production location discourage firms’ relocation abroad. While larger, more productive 
firms and firms with higher labour intensities have, ceteris paribus, higher propensities to 
relocate, they also face higher exit barriers if the country from which they consider relocating has 
strict employment protection laws.  Our predictions are supported empirically, using firm level 
data for 28 OECD countries.  
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1. INTODUCTION 
Discussions on the effects of firm flexibility remain −in spite of the vast literature on the topic− 
prominent, both in the academic literature and among policy makers.  One factor that affects firm 
flexibility that has been discussed recently is the institutional environment, and more specifically, 
labour market regulations.  Employment protection legislation (EPL) in particular is seen as an 
important source of firm inflexibility as it causes firms to incur adjustment costs in the form of 
redundancy payments whenever workers are laid off.1  
It is therefore not surprising that there is a sizeable body of work studying the effect of 
EPL on a firm’s decision to enter a market.  This is particularly relevant for multinational 
enterprises (MNEs), which consider multiple host countries as potential production locations.  
The empirical evidence provided by the literature (using aggregate country level data) generally 
shows that EPL acts as a barrier to entry for international firms considering foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in potential host countries.2  The advantage offered by flexible labour markets is 
clear:  they allow MNEs to hire and fire easily, thus enabling them to adjust production easily to 
changes in economic conditions.  
What has been largely neglected in this literature is the fact that MNEs may not only care 
about the state of labour market regulations in the prospective future host market, but also in the 
country of its current location.  In this paper, we study the extent to which EPL is a barrier to 
exit.3  Although EPL as an institutional barrier to exit from a given location has received scant 
attention in the literature,4 it matters in the real world for both firms and governments.  If firms 
considering relocation are hindered in that decision by significant EPL-induced exit costs, their 
internationalisation strategy may be inhibited, preventing them from reaping the possible gains 
                                                     
1 When EPL is high, it is costly to fire workers and hence employment responses to shocks and/or the business cycle are 
smaller (see, for instance, Bertola and Rogerson, 1997; Garibaldi, 1998; Messina and Vallanti, 2007).  Also, EPL gives firms an 
incentive to limit changes in output (see, for instance, Bertola et al., 2010).  Belot et al. (2007) show that EPL effects on 
welfare are non-monotonic.   
2 MNEs tend to prefer locations with low levels of labour market regulation (Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2005; Olney, 2013).  
Work examining the link between employment protection legislation and FDI presents evidence of the negative effect of EPL 
on inward FDI (e.g., Nicoletti et al, 2003, and Görg, 2005).  Examples of theoretical work that features the effect of EPL on the 
location decision of firms are given by Haaland et al. (2003), who discuss this issue for a monopolist firm, and Dewit et al. 
(2013), who focus on the interaction of firms’ location decisions in an oligopolistic framework.  Comprehensive reviews of the 
literature on the general determinants of FDI and multinational production are provided by Barba-Navaretti and Venables 
(2004) and Blonigen (2005).   
3 In the spirit of Stigler’s (1968) definition of entry barriers, Geroski et al. (1990) define an exit barrier as a cost that a firm 
must bear in order to leave a market (not borne by firms that are not yet established in the market or by established firms that 
have not chosen to leave the market). 
4 The literature does, however, offer several examples of government policies that have contributed to or have tried to prevent 
relocation by firms.  For instance, Motta and Thisse (1994) investigate whether a strict environmental policy may cause firms 
to relocate, and Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2002) examine how the EU’s structural funds affect firm and industry relocation.5 For 
example, Muendler and Becker (2010) and Harrison and McMillan (2011) show that MNEs’ relocation of activity can, ceteris 
paribus, have negative effects on employment in the home country, while Hijzen et al. (2011) find evidence of positive effects.  
There are numerous extensive reports on relocation (see, for instance, the report commissioned by the European Parliament 
on the re-localisation of EU industry (2007) and the book by Bhagwati and Blinder (2009) discussing offshoring of American 
jobs). 
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from such internationalisation.  At the same time, less or slower relocation resulting from strict 
EPL implies a lower burden in terms of the social adjustment cost potentially accompanying firm 
relocation.  This is especially relevant in an era in which MNEs have become increasingly 
footloose, leaving some countries with a rapidly eroding industrial base.  In fact, the debate on 
relocation remains intense on either side of the Atlantic, both among academics and policy 
makers.5 
We are not only interested in the link between EPL and relocation at the aggregate level 
but consider differences across firms.  We study whether and, if so, to what extent certain firms, 
due to their specific characteristics, face a higher EPL-induced barrier to exit than other firms.  
Although EPL is de jure not industry specific, there is good reason to believe that industries are de 
facto not equally affected by a country’s EPL.  In fact, it is unlikely that even firms in the same 
industry will be affected equally.  Thus, firm size, productivity and technological differences may 
imply that different firmsoperating in the same industry effectively face a differential barrier to 
exit induced by the same country-specific degree of EPL.   
The starting points of our analysis are two stylised facts.  First, relocation has been 
particularly relevant in manufacturing6 and, second, is mainly motivated by low labour costs 
abroad, as suggested by survey data (European Commission, 2012).  We, therefore, construct a 
simple and straightforward theoretical framework in which we focus on a firm’s relocation 
decision.  We first discuss a benchmark without employment protection and show that firms 
with different characteristics also differ in their propensity to relocate: a large, highly productive 
and labour-intensive firm has a higher propensity to relocate than its smaller, less productive and 
more capital-intensive counterpart.7  Second, if there is employment protection in the current 
production location of the MNE, its propensity to relocate falls due to the EPL-induced exit 
barrier.  We show that this reduction in its propensity to relocate is stronger the larger, more 
productive or more labour-intensive the firm is.  Thus, employment protection creates a larger 
barrier to exit for those firms that “naturally” have a larger propensity to relocate.   
Motivated by the theoretical insights, we conduct an empirical analysis using firm level 
data in 28 OECD countries for the period 1997-2007. We do this by merging an annual 
employment protection index with a firm-level dataset to identify firms that reduce their 
operations at home and at the same time open up new foreign affiliates or acquire existing firms 
abroad.  Our dataset, therefore, allows us to capture not only the home country of the MNE but 
also the destination country to which the relocation takes place.  Our results for firms in 
manufacturing are broadly in line with the theoretical expectations as outlined above.8 
                                                     
5 For example, Muendler and Becker (2010) and Harrison and McMillan (2011) show that MNEs’ relocation of activity can, 
ceteris paribus, have negative effects on employment in the home country, while Hijzen et al. (2011) find evidence of positive 
effects.  There are numerous extensive reports on relocation (see, for instance, the report commissioned by the European 
Parliament on the re-localisation of EU industry (2007) and the book by Bhagwati and Blinder (2009) discussing offshoring of 
American jobs). 
6 Cohen (2006) and Amiti and Wei (2005) point out that relocation in services is increasing but remains low.  Blinder (2007), 
however, perceives the observed increase in relocation in services more as a threat to jobs in the source country. 
7 This is in line with Pennings and Sleuwaegen (2000, 2006), who show −for a dataset of Belgian firms− that firms’ propensity 
to relocate strongly depends on firm-specific characteristics.   Other empirical work includes Aw and Lee (2008) and Chen and 
Moore (2010), who study the location decisions of French and Taiwanese multinationals, respectively.  None of these studies 
look at the effect of EPL in the home country on firms’ relocation decisions. 
8 Note that, in both our theoretical model and the empirical analysis, we are limited to investigating relocation at the 
“extensive margin”. The main reason is that our firm level data does not observe well employment figures and wages for 
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Our findings have important policy implications.  Indeed, firms that relocate are likely to 
be large and productive and hence their relocation may potentially cause large job losses in the 
country from where they relocate.  However, strict EPL in the latter may render such a large firm 
relocation scenario less likely by significantly reducing the propensity to relocate for these types 
of firms.  While this means that firms in such countries are restricted in reaping the potential 
gains from internationalisation, it also means that countries with strict EPL may be less 
susceptible to massive employment losses induced by large-firm relocation than those with 
rather lax EPL.     
As far as we are aware, there are few studies that study the link between EPL and 
relocation.  Dewit et al. (2009) examine the effect of EPL on aggregate bilateral in- and outward 
FDI-flows between countries.  While Dewit et al. (2009) is concerned with the effect of EPL on 
aggregate bilateral in- and outward FDI-flows between countries, this paper differs in focus in that 
it examines how firm-specific features may magnify or indeed mitigate the effects of EPL as a 
barrier to relocate.   
In Section 2, we set up a theoretical framework that models the relocation decision of a 
firm and discusses how specific firm-characteristics affect that decision.  In Section 3, we present 
an empirical model and describe our data set.  Section 4 reports our results and Section 5 
concludes.  
2. MODELLING A FIRM’S RELOCATION DECISION 
Aiming to illustrate how an individual firm’s specific characteristics affect its relocation decision 
when it faces employment protection in its initial production location, we set up a stylised 
framework.  Consider a firm that produces for an integrated market for two periods.  The firm 
has some degree of market power and thus faces a downward sloping residual demand 
function.9  Its demand in the integrated market in each period t is given by  
 
tt qap −=          (1) 
 
where tp  denotes the price and tq  stands for output in period t ( 2,1=t ).   
There are two possible production locations, countries ‘Home’ (H) and ‘Foreign’ (F).  We 
assume that the firm’s production location in period one is country H and that the fixed cost of 
setting up a plant in H has been sunk; hence there are no fixed costs to be incurred in period 
                                                     
affiliate firms, particularly in developing countries. Ideally, we would have liked to test for relocation determinants due to 
shifting employment patterns between existing affiliates, but significant missing information for both employee numbers and 
wages does not allow us to capture this “intensive margin”.  However, while having such information may potentially offer an 
interesting additional channel through which one can document relocation patterns, it would not alter the main qualitative 
results concerning the extensive margin of relocation obtained in this paper. 
9 The dataset we will use consists of firms from various subsectors in manufacturing, some of which may be best modelled as 
monopolistically competitive, while others are best captured by an oligopolistic market structure.  So, it is unlikely to be the 
case that one market structure fits all subsectors.  However, since we are not concerned with sorting the firms in a particular 
monopolistically competitive subsector into groups, nor aim to study strategic relocation choices typically present in an 
oligopolistic setting, we choose to remain agnostic about the market structure in which the firm operates. 
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one.10  The firm uses two factors of production, labour ( tl ) and capital ( tk ).  Factor prices for 
labour and capital in Home are the same in both periods and are respectively denoted by the 
wage, Hw , and the rental rate, Hr .  Factor prices in ‘Foreign’ are Fw  and Fr  for labour and 
capital respectively.  While the factor price of capital, Fr , remains constant over the two periods, 
the firm faces uncertainty about the wage in Foreign in period two.  More specifically, there is a 
possibility that an exogenous idiosyncratic wage shock will occur in Foreign in period two.  Let 
ρ  denote the probability that the wage rate in Foreign is equal to the Foreign period-one wage 
(i.e., FF ww 12 = ).  With the complementary probability, ρ−1 , Foreign’s period-2 wage rate is 
given by zww FF −= 12  (with 0>z ).  We assume that, after such a wage shock has occurred, 
labour in F is relatively cheap, i.e., HHFF rwrw //2 < .  When uncertainty is resolved in period 
two and the firm observes the actual wage in Foreign, the firm chooses either to stay in country H 
or to relocate to country F.11  Its costs depend on the production location.  If it decides to produce 
in F in period two, it will incur a fixed cost of setting up a plant there, denoted by FF . 
  While local factor prices are exogenously given to the firm, unit factor requirements for 
labour and capital, denoted by lα   and kα , are assumed to be identical across countries but 
different across firms; their reciprocals represent the marginal productivity of labour and capital 
within the firm.  Marginal production costs for period t in country F, Ftc , are given by: 
 
F
k
F
tl
F
t rwc αα +=                     (2a) 
 
while marginal production costs in country H in both periods are given by:12   
 
H
k
H
l
H rwc αα += .         (2b) 
 
The firm’s workforce in period t is tlt ql α= , whereas its capital is tkt qk α= , implying that its 
labour-capital rate is equal to kl αα / . Note that, since unit factor requirements, lα  and kα , are 
firm-specific, Hc  and Fc2  are too. 
 Apart from production costs, the firm incurs potential firing costs.  More specifically, in 
country H, there is employment protection regulation. As a result, firms producing in H incur 
firing costs if they reduce the number of workers.  Firing costs are represented by 
)( 21
HH
l
H qqI −αl , where Hl  is a parameter that captures the degree of EPL (with higher values 
                                                     
10 The firm could either be a domestic firm of country H or a multinational that previously decided to locate there.  We do not 
focus on the firm’s initial location decision here as it does not feature in the empirical part of the paper.  Naturally, when 
initially setting up a plant in Home, firms would have taken local EPL into account.  This would affect a firm’s initial size as it 
would take into account that future relocation is a possibility.  For an explicit investigation of the effect of EPL on firms’ initial 
location decisions, see Dewit et al. (2009). 
11 Note that other types of shocks, such as an increase in period two in the Home wage rate, or even a positive demand shock 
in the integrated market in period two, can give the firm a similar incentive to relocate.  For instance, Dewit et al. (2009) 
model relocation as a result of a permanent positive demand shock. 
12 The cost specification is based on a Leontief production technology.This assumption is imposed for simplicity, but does not 
affect the results of the model in a qualitative sense.  A more flexible production technology would imply that the incentive to 
relocate would be higher (as firms would substitute capital for labour as the latter is relatively cheaper in Foreign), but would 
not affect the EPL-induced exit costs from the Home location.  
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reflecting stricter EPL); I is an indicator variable with 1=I  if HH qq 21 >  and 0=I  otherwise.  By 
contrast, there is no EPL in country F (i.e., 0=Fl ).13     
Let us now describe the firm’s decisions.  In period one, the firm, located in country H, 
chooses its output level for that period, while facing uncertainty about the period-two wage rate 
in Foreign.  At the start of period two, the period-two Foreign wage is observed and the firm 
decides whether or not to relocate to region F.  It also chooses its period-two output level.  There 
are two possible dynamic location equilibria.  Using tH  and tF , respectively, to denote Home 
and Foreign as the chosen production location in time period t, we have ),( 21 HH , the 
equilibrium in which the firm stays in the initial production location, and ),( 21 FH , the 
equilibrium in which the firm relocates to the region without employment protection.  Naturally, 
in practice, the equilibrium without relocation will occur most of the time since the firm would 
not have chosen H as its initial location otherwise.  However, since we want to analyse the 
possible relocation decision of a firm facing employment protection, we will focus on when the 
relocation equilibrium ),( 21 FH  is likely to occur.    
In period two, the firm relocates if period-two profits from relocation, ),( 212 FHπ , 
exceed period-two profits from staying in country H, ),( 212 HHπ .  So, the firm’s relocation 
condition is: 
 
),(),( 212212 HHFH ππ > .        (3) 
 
If the firm relocates to F, it shuts down its plant in H, thus incurring EPL-induced exit costs, 
H
l
H q1αl .14  In addition, the set-up costs of the new plant in country F have to be paid.  Hence, 
period-two profits in case of relocation are:  
 
FH
l
HFF qqcpFH F−−−= 1222212 )(),( αlπ       (4a) 
 
If, however, the firm decides to stay in H in period two, it occurs firing costs only if and to the 
extent that period-two output is lower than its period-one output level; its profit function is: 
 
)()(),( 2122212
HH
l
HHH qqIqcpHH −−−= αlπ                (4b) 
 
A comparison of expressions (4a) and (4b) shows that HF cc <2  is a necessary −but not 
sufficient− condition for relocation (i.e., for expression (3) to hold).  Using the expressions for 
optimal output levels (which are derived in Appendix A), we can rewrite the relocation condition 
(expression (3)) as: 
                                                     
13 It is straightforward to incorporate EPL in Foreign, with FH ll > .  This would not change anything in our two-period model.  
In a more dynamic extension of the model, in which another period would be added, it may raise the barrier to entry into 
Foreign and therefore reduce the relative attractiveness of that location.  As a result, the firm’s propensity to relocate to 
Foreign would fall, but the qualitative relationship between the firm’s EPL-induced exit cost from Home and that firm’s 
propensity to relocate to Foreign would remain unaltered. 
14 For simplicity, we abstract from partial relocation in this stylised set-up.  Partial relocation would be obtained if, for 
instance, the production process exhibited increasing marginal costs.  Of course, real-world relocation is typically partial, 
which is how we define relocation in the empirical model. However, partial relocation does not alter the qualitative 
relationship between relocation and employment protection and hence the sign predictions obtained from our theoretical 
framework are applicable to partial as well as complete relocation.   
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H
l
HF
HF
qcaca 1
22
2
4
)()(
αl+F>
−−−
      (5) 
 
So, with FH cc 2> , relocation is possible and, ceteris paribus, more likely if the wage shock in 
Foreign (z) is large since it widens the difference between prospective operating profits in F and 
H  (that is, the left-hand-side of the inequality in (5) increases). If there were no EPL in H 
( 0=Hl ), the firm would relocate to country F provided that the gap in operating profits 
between F and H is wide enough to compensate for the entry costs ( FF ) associated with 
relocation.  However, given the EPL in country H ( 0>Hl ), a firm that considers relocating faces 
firing costs and hence exit costs from country H (captured by the second term of the right-hand-
side of the inequality in (5)).  So, relative to the case in which there is no EPL in H, the gap in 
operating profits between F and H now needs to be wider for the firm to relocate to country F in 
order to compensate for the additional exit costs associated with relocation. 
We now provide an intuitive interpretation of the relocation condition for firms that are 
facing EPL in their initial production location, focussing on three firm-specific features: size, 
productivity and labour intensity. 
 First, we examine how firm size affects a firm’s propensity to relocate.  In the absence of 
EPL, larger firms have a higher propensity to relocate.  The period-two cost advantage when 
producing in F applies to a larger volume of production when the firm is larger, which magnifies 
the profit difference between producing in F or in H more than for a small firm.  A similar 
reasoning pertains to lower-cost (i.e., more productive) firms.  All else equal, lower-cost firms will 
produce more than their higher-cost counterparts.  Presented with a period-two cost advantage 
when producing in F thus also widens the operating profits between producing in H and in F 
more than for a similar higher-cost (less productive) firm.  So, just like larger firms have greater 
potential gains from relocating to F than smaller ones, more productive firms gain more from 
relocating than less productive ones.15  However, all else equal, EPL-induced exit costs are also 
higher for larger and more productive firms simply because their initial output level in H, and 
hence their firing cost when relocating, are higher. This implies that, ceteris paribus, larger and 
more productive firms have higher exit costs from a country with high EPL than their smaller 
and less productive counterparts, which mitigate their relatively higher potential gains from 
relocation.  It suggests that EPL tends to narrow the differences in the propensity to relocate 
between large and small firms and between more and less productive ones. 
Next, we take a closer look at the effect of labour intensity on a firm’s propensity to 
relocate.  To isolate the labour intensity from the firm productivity effect, we compare the 
propensity to relocate for home firms that are equally productive, or, have the same marginal 
production costs ( Hc ), but operate with different relative labour intensities.  In the absence of 
EPL, the gain of relocation towards countries in which labour is relatively cheap is naturally 
higher for more labour intensive firms.  However, EPL in the country from where the firm 
considers relocation raises exit costs ( Hl
H q1αl ) and these exit costs are higher the more labour 
intensive the firm is (i.e., the higher lα ).  So, among equally productive, equally-sized firms, we 
                                                     
15 This is consistent with the result found in Helpman et al. (2004) that only the most productive firms engage in FDI as only 
they make sufficient operating profit to cover the set-up cost of FDI. 
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expect that highly labour-intensive firms gain most from relocation, while these are at the same 
time being hindered most in their relocation decision if they face high levels of EPL in the country 
from which they consider relocation.  Thus, we expect that the difference in relocation propensity 
between firms with a high and a low labour intensity will be narrowed by EPL and will decrease 
as the degree of EPL becomes stricter. 
. 
3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Empirical Model 
The above discussion of the theoretical model provides the motivation for a number of 
hypotheses which we investigate in the remainder of the paper: 
1. The level of employment protection in the home country is negatively associated with 
the relocation decision of the firms that produce there.   
While this is, per se, not surprising, taking into account firm-specific features provides a more 
complex set of hypotheses: 
2. Firm size, productivity and labour intensity affect a firm’s propensity to relocate 
positively.   
3. Employment protection lowers the propensity to relocate for large firms more than for 
small firms, for highly productive firms more than for less productive firms, and more for 
firms with a high labour intensity than for those with a low labour intensity.   
In order to check the empirical validity or otherwise of these theoretically derived hypotheses, we 
propose to estimate the propensity to relocate for firm i, Pr(D)it , conditional on a set of covariates.  
Specifically, we estimate: 
Pr(D)it = β1 λht + β2 Cit + β3 (λht * Cit) + β4 X it + ε it    (6) 
where λht is the level of employment protection in firm i’s home country h at time t.  Cit is, 
alternatively, the size, productivity or labour intensity of firm i at time t and Xit is a vector of 
control variables.  The model also includes full sets of industry, year and country dummies.  
Hypotheses 1 to 3 imply β1 < 0, β2 > 0 and β3 < 0.   
 
Data description 
The empirical model described in (6) is estimated using firm level data on the location 
decisions of firms from 28 OECD home countries.  Our data covers the manufacturing sector, as 
the theoretical background framework was set up with the manufacturing sector in mind, for 
which low foreign wages have been highlighted as one of the main reasons for relocation in the 
sector. 
The dataset is collected from ORBIS, which is a comprehensive and rich firm-level dataset 
provided by Bureau van Dijk.  Bureau van Dijk collects financial, economic and other firm-level 
information from various sources, including official bodies such as Companies House in the UK 
and similar commercial and official registries in other countries.  Our sample includes an 
unbalanced panel of firms in 28 OECD countries for the period 1997-2007.  We have information 
on the characteristics of the firms, such as location, output, employment, labour intensity, 
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productivity, industry classification on an annual basis, and we can crucially observe whether 
they have reduced their operations at home and at the same time set up affiliates abroad.16   
We define “relocation” in our empirical analysis in three ways. Our first definition is 
similar to Pennings and Sleuwaegen (2000), who define relocation as a firm reducing its 
operations at home by more than 10 per cent of their size (measured in number of employees) 
and at the same time opening up a new foreign affiliate or acquire an existing firm abroad.  We 
will refer to this relocation definition as “Definition 1”.  The establishment of the foreign affiliate 
is based on the date of incorporation of the foreign affiliate which is also available in the data set. 
Our second definition of relocation –henceforth referred to as “Definition 2”− is more flexible in 
terms of the timing of the relocation, such that we allow for a one year window before and after 
the establishment of the affiliate abroad. MNEs may decide to reduce employment before or after 
the decision of relocation is taken. Our third definition –“Definition 3”− tests the sensitivity of the 
10 per cent employment reduction in the labour force at home and adopts a common criterion for 
mass layoffs used in the labour economics literature of 30 per cent (Jacobson, 1993). Definitions 2 
and 3 will act as robustness checks for our baseline results.   
Since a firm may have more than one foreign affiliate, and therefore qualifies potentially 
as having carried out more than one relocation, we construct the dataset in bilateral form.  Our 
dataset includes 28 OECD countries (where the parent firm is located) and 95 different host 
countries (where foreign affiliates are located). Each parent firm has at least one foreign affiliate, 
in which case it appears once in the dataset with that home-host combination. Therefore a parent 
firm appears as many times as it has affiliates in different host countries. The vast majority of 
firms have few foreign affiliates. For example, 60 per cent of the firms have 5 foreign affiliates or 
less in different host countries. The average number of host countries that a parent firm has a 
foreign affiliate in is 7.5 (range is 1-59 host countries).17 
We use two-digit primary NACE industry codes to classify firms in the manufacturing 
sector (i.e. NACE 15-37).  Since our analysis is based on registered firms and their filed accounts, 
all large firms as well as a significant share of small and medium sized firms are included in the 
database, which provides a good coverage across OECD countries.18 
Annual data on employment protection are obtained from the World Competitiveness 
Report of the World Economic Forum.19  This is an index that is constructed from extensive 
surveys of managers in 138 countries, conducted by the World Economic Forum. In the survey, 
participants are asked to give a score to a number of questions describing the overall business 
climate and competitiveness of the country in which the firm operates. The scale of this index for 
the period 1997-2007 ranges from 1 to 7. The particular criterion for the index used here is: 
“Hiring and firing practices are too restricted by the government or are flexible enough”. The index is 
                                                     
16 A firm owns a foreign affiliate if it holds at least 10 percent of the voting stocks. ORBIS reports firm accounts in either 
consolidated or unconsolidated form.  We include only unconsolidated accounts as they represent the domestic activities of 
firms and exclude any information from affiliates at home or abroad.  In contrast, consolidated accounts aggregate the 
activities of all firms belonging to a group worldwide, regardless of location and industrial affiliation.  
17 In cases where firms have more than one affiliate in the same host country, they are treated the same as firms that are in 
the host country with one affiliate. This should not pose a problem for the purposes of this paper. 
18 Desai et al. (2003) discuss data collection by Bureau van Dijk and conclude that, across countries, the database represents 
economies quite well.  Klapper et al. (2004) also point to its large coverage compared to other data sources. 
19 Similar data were used by Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) and Amiti and Wakelin (2003).   
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defined in such a way that a higher value reflects a more protected labour environment. In other 
words, 𝜆𝐻 is scaled such that a higher index refers to a higher degree of employment protection.  
Hence, a negative sign of the relevant coefficient will indicate that higher labour protection 
hinders relocation (β1 < 0), as expected from the theoretical discussion.   
We measure a firm’s size by its number of employees. Labour intensity is measured by 
the ratio of labour to capital. We measure productivity by estimating total factor productivity 
using the now common method by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), which controls for simultaneity 
in input choice. Other firm level controls that may be correlated with the propensity to relocate 
are a firm’s average wage level and the ratio of intangible to total assets.  Lower wages abroad 
increase the likelihood for firms to consider relocation options there (as suggested by a fall in Fw2  
in the theoretical framework).  Intangible to total assets are used as an (imperfect) indicator of 
firm-specific assets (Markusen, 1995), with higher levels of intangible to total assets increasing a 
firm’s likelihood of moving abroad via relocation, in order to reap the benefits of its firm specific 
advantages. 
As each OECD member country has its own institutional environment in which firms 
operate, we control for some of the time varying country-level differences by including the 
corporate tax rate in the home country, as one of the main macroeconomic variables determining 
firm location and relocation (De Mooij and Ederveen, 2003). We expect that the higher the tax rate 
in the home country, the higher the likelihood of firms to move abroad.   
Finally, since we not only know the home country of the investor but also the destination 
country to which the relocation takes place, we include in the empirical specification host country 
– time dummies to control for time varying unobserved destination specific effects.  The 
definition and sources of all variables included in the model is provided in Appendix B. 
To address potential endogeneity between a firm's relocation in a given year and our 
variables measuring firm characteristics such as labour intensity, we have lagged all our right 
hand side variables by one period.  We are aware that this is not optimal but in the absence of 
convincing instruments for the firm characteristics, we proceed in this way and are careful not to 
over-interpret our results on firm characteristics as causal effects.  The main variable of interest, 
EPL is measured at the country level and is therefore less likely to be endogenous to a firm’s 
decision to relocate.   
We utilise two estimators, namely a pooled probit and a random effects panel probit 
estimator. To control for potential path dependence, we include a lag of the dependent variable 
for both estimators. We also utilise Wooldridge (2005) to address the initial condition problem 
and delivering consistent estimates. Hence, this approach deals with firm unobserved 
heterogeneity that is intrinsic to firms from the initial period of observation, which may induce 
endogeneity concerns in the model. In order to minimise spurious correlation between the 
decision to relocate and other non-observables, we also control for country, industry and year 
fixed effects, by including full sets of dummies at these levels.  
Table 1 shows the coverage of OECD firms that either relocate or not, at some point 
during our sample period 1997-2007. The majority of relocating firms are based in Europe and 
North America with significant numbers from Eastern Europe as well as Japan and South Korea. 
These multinational firms invest heavily in other developed or OECD countries; around 30 per 
cent of affiliates are located outside the OECD.   
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Table 1: Distribution of Relocation across OECD countries (1997-2007) 
 Employment 
protection index 
(Average) 
Employment 
protection Index 
(sd) 
Number of firms 
not relocating 
Number of Firms 
that relocate 
Austria 3.69 0.37 466 62 
Australia 3.61 0.35 39 1 
Belgium 4.37 0.41 671 130 
Canada 2.59 0.25 466 11 
Switzerland 1.74 0.47 908 109 
Czech Republic 3.22 0.67 193 49 
Germany 4.78 0.24 1,808 151 
Denmark 1.67 0.46 288 33 
Estonia 2.74 0.32 32 12 
Spain 4.14 0.34 1,276 178 
Finland 3.58 0.38 234 82 
France 4.65 0.19 1,330 164 
Great Britain 2.51 0.57 429 94 
Greece 4.24 0.17 27 1 
Hungary 2.69 0.69 30 1 
Ireland 3.58 0.37 50 3 
Italy 4.57 0.21 2,118 526 
Japan 3.45 0.56 360 62 
Korea 3.24 0.43 44 10 
Luxembourg 3.75 0.48 12 1 
Mexico 3.52 0.40 42 5 
Norway 4.41 0.22 184 36 
Poland 3.40 0.42 68 4 
Portugal 4.23 0.21 149 12 
Sweden 4.57 0.30 592 152 
Slovenia 4.31 0.19 74 21 
Slovakia 2.95 0.67 93 20 
United States 1.86 0.23 987 19 
Non-OECD countries*   -- -- 
Total   12,970 1,949 
Source: Authors calculations using ORBIS. The countries in the Non-OECD group include: UAE, Albania, Armenia, Angola, 
Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Barbados, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Bulgaria, Bahrain, Burundi, Benin, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Botswana, Cameroon, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Algeria, Ecuador, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Honduras, Croatia, Indonesia, India, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, 
Cambodia, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Sri Lanka, Lithuania, Latvia, Libya, Morocco, Moldova, Madagascar, Macedonia, Mali, 
Mongolia, Mauritania, Malta, Mauritius, Malawi, Malaysia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Nicaragua, Oman, Panama, 
Peru, Philippines, Pakistan, Paraguay, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Senegal, Suriname, El Salvador, 
Syria, Chad, Thailand, Tunisia, Trinidad and Tobago, Taiwan, Tanzania, Ukraine, Uganda, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, 
Vietnam, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
Since relocation is quite a drastic decision, it is not surprising that firms that actually relocate 
make up a small proportion of all firms. In other words, column three shows that the number of 
firms that do not relocate within the period 1997-2007 is much higher than the number of firms 
that relocate in almost every OECD country (i.e. column 4). The employment protection index 
also varies significantly across countries as well as across years during our sample period. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the key variables that characterise relocating firms 
and firms which do not relocate, for the high-tech and low-tech manufacturing sectors separately 
(see Appendix Table B1 for the classification).  Distinguishing relocating from non-relocating 
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firms shows that, in manufacturing, we find that the former are “better” in terms of most aspects 
of firm characteristics measured, namely larger and more productive, and less labour intensive.   
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics of firm-level variables 
Variable (definition) Relocating Firms 
 
Mean 
(sd) 
Non – Relocating Firms 
 
Mean 
(sd) 
High-tech Manufacturing sector   
Number of employees 1,114 
(3,033) 
533 
(3,124) 
Log Labour-intensity -3.88 
(1.76) 
-3.35 
(1.35) 
Log TFP 5.18 
(0.80) 
4.82 
(0.62) 
Low-tech Manufacturing sector   
Number of employees 677 392 
 (1,867) (2,556) 
Log Labour-intensity -4.25 -3.67 
 (1.80) (1.29) 
Log TFP 4.92 4.72 
 (0.81) (0.60) 
Source: Authors’ calculations using ORBIS database.  
 
Estimation results 
The baseline estimation results from the probit and random effects panel probit 
regressions of equation (6) without the vector X are presented in Tables 3a-3c for each of the 
relocation definitions.  Overall, we find broad empirical support for hypotheses 1 to 3 stated 
above.   
We start with a specification including only EPL without interactions in Table 3a, column 
(1).  This shows, as expected, that higher employment protection in the home country 
discourages firms’ relocation activity.  While the direction of this effect is clear, it is difficult to 
gauge the economic importance of the estimated effect.  In order to say something more about the 
actual meaning of the estimated relationship, we use the model to calculate predicted values of 
relocating for two hypothetical economies.  We set all control variables to their mean levels but 
let the level of home country EPL differ, setting it in one case equal to 2.59 (the level of Canada) 
and the other case to 4.65 (the level of France).  Our model predicts that, in the first case, we have 
a relocation probability of 6.6 percent, in the second case of 2.0 percent.  This implies that, for an 
economy at mean levels of covariates, if we increase the level of employment protection from the 
relatively low level of Canada to the higher level of France, we would reduce the relocation 
probability of the average firm by 4.6 percentage points.  This is an economically significant 
effect.20   
In columns (2) and (6) we consider the role of firm size for the link between employment 
protection and relocation.  We find that larger firms are more likely to relocate activity.  As 
suggested by our theoretical model, the negative coefficient on the interaction of size and Home 
employment protection indicates that employment protection lowers the propensity to relocate 
                                                     
20 These estimations are carried out using the “margins” command in Stata.   
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more for firms that are large.21  In fact, irrespective of whether Definition 1, 2 or 3 is used for 
relocation, we find similar results with respect to Home employment protection, firm size and 
their interaction term. 
In the further specifications in Tables 3a-3c we consider the impact of the other firm 
characteristics included in our theoretical model, namely labour intensity and productivity, 
respectively.  We find, in line with our expectation, that while more labour intensive firms are 
more likely to relocate, their propensity to relocate is significantly more mitigated by 
employment protection than their less labour intensive counterparts’ relocation propensity.  
Again, these results hold for all three definitions of relocation.   
Our results for the relationship between productivity and relocation are, however, less 
clear cut when different definitions for relocation are used.  Using Definition 2 of relocation (see 
Table 3b), our estimations seem to indicate that more productive firms are less likely to 
(“massively”) relocate and are less likely to be hindered by Home employment protection in 
relocating than their less productive counterparts.  But, this effect seems to be somewhat weaker 
when considering Definitions 1 and 3 (see Tables 3a and 3c).  As will be discussed, we find that 
this is driven by low-tech manufacturing industries and that the results for the high-tech 
manufacturing sector are as expected (see Tables 5 and 6). 
 
 
                                                     
21 Calculation of marginal effects indicates that increasing the value of the interaction term from the 10th percentile to the 
median value – while keeping all other covariates constant at their mean – reduces the probability to relocate by 1.4 
percentage points.   
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Table 3a: Baseline results – Definition 1 of Relocation (i.e. instant) 
   
Probit Model (Marginal effects) 
 
Random Effects Panel Probit Model 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Relocation (t-1) 0.147*** 0.149*** 0.157*** 0.155*** 0.224*** 0.216*** 0.249*** 0.279*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013) (0.0409) (0.0409) (0.0422) (0.0447) 
Home l -0.018*** -0.013*** -0.032*** -0.024*** -0.285*** -0.198*** -0.530*** -0.394*** 
 (0.00214) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.0362) (0.0529) (0.0584) (0.0422) 
Size  0.005***    0.111***   
  (0.002)    (0.0289)   
Size * Home l  -0.001**    -0.0157**   
  (0.0003)    (0.00688)   
Labour intensity   0.013***    0.266***  
   (0.005)    (0.0487)  
Labour intensity * Home l   -0.002**    -0.0483***  
   (0.001)    (0.0114)  
TFP    -6.73e-05    -0.00130*** 
    (4.23e-05)    (0.000445) 
TFP * Home l    1.51e-05*    0.000287*** 
    (8.96e-06)    (9.54e-05) 
Predicted probability 0.038 0.038 0.035 0.039     
Wald chi2 2367.590 2372.140 1051.260 968.17 1002.79    
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000    
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.069 0.072 0.076     
Log pseudolikelihood -15,279.767 -15,268.499 -13,819.805  -12,650.074 -14,909.192    
Year, dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 101,003 101,003 89,067 82,871 101,079 101,079 89,140 82,934 
Notes: All explanatory variables are lagged one period. All specifications include a full set of year, industry and country dummies and destinations - year pair fixed effects. Clustered 
standard errors are shown in parenthesis and at the parent country level for the specifications without interactions and at the parent firm-level for the other specifications. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3b: Baseline results −Definition 2 of Relocation (i.e. flexible timing) 
   
Probit Model (Marginal effects) 
 
Random Effects Panel Probit Model 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Relocation (t-1) 0.580*** 0.580*** 0.581*** 0.581*** 1.874*** 1.876*** 1.878*** 1.887*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) 
Home l -0.043*** -0.029*** -0.073*** -0.050*** -0.249*** -0.170*** -0.427*** -0.295*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.000) (0.023) (0.030) (0.035) (0.028) 
Size  0.016***    0.096***   
  (0.003)    (0.015)   
Size * Home l  -0.002***    -0.015***   
  (0.001)    (0.004)   
Labour intensity   0.028***    0.161***  
   (0.005)    (0.027)  
Labour intensity * Home l   -0.007***    -0.040***  
   (0.001)    (0.006)  
TFP    -8.92e-05    -0.001* 
    (5.7e-05)    (0.000) 
TFP * Home l    2.19e-05*    1.3e-04** 
    (1.25e-06)    (6.02e-05) 
Predicted probability 0.096 0.096 0.097 0.095     
Wald chi2 32,940.40 32,949.80 29,994.25 27,674.58 18190.24 18257.66 16769.13 15469.55 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.261 0.262 0.270 0.272     
Log pseudolikelihood -29,653.699 -29588.344 -26,221.51   -24,089.18 -29,653.70 -29588.347 -26221.511 -24089.186 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 101,003 101,003 89,067 82,871 101,079 101,079 89,140 82,934 
Notes: All explanatory variables are lagged one period. All specifications include a full set of year, industry and country dummies and destinations - year pair fixed effects. Clustered standard 
errors are shown in parenthesis and at the parent country level for the specifications without interactions and at the parent firm-level for the other specifications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 3c: Baseline results – Definition 3 of Relocation (i.e. mass layoffs) 
   
Probit Model (Marginal effects) 
 
Random Effects Panel Probit Model 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Relocation (t-1) 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.008*** 0.003 -0.387*** -0.378*** -0.447*** -0.508*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.058) (0.0585) (0.0635) (0.0706) 
Home l -0.019*** -0.007*** -0.027*** -0.020*** -0.459*** -0.106* -0.678*** -0.506*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.040) (0.0608) (0.0601) (0.0454) 
Size  0.011***    0.335***   
  (0.001)    (0.0335)   
Size * Home l  -0.002***    -0.0611***   
  (0.000)    (0.00785)   
Labour intensity   0.011***    0.315***  
   (0.002)    (0.0481)  
Labour intensity * Home l   -0.002***    -0.0592***  
   (0.001)    (0.0113)  
TFP    -7.63e-05***    -0.00182*** 
    (1.70e-05)    (0.000424) 
TFP * Home l    1.77e-05***    0.000421*** 
    (3.85e-06)    (9.08e-05) 
Predicted probability 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.028     
Wald chi2 2956.11 3008.37 3123.99 3136.08 1693.02 1632.33 1762.47 1820.22 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.1002 0.107 0.114 0.129     
Log pseudolikelihood -11,232.401 -11,146.437 -10,006.521   -9,095.128 -11,053.395 -10.947.974 -9828.055 -8961.402 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 101,001 101,001 88,308 82,185 101,079 101,079 89,140 82,934 
Notes: All explanatory variables are lagged one period. All specifications include a full set of year, industry and country dummies and destinations - year pair fixed effects. Clustered standard 
errors are shown in parenthesis and at the parent country level for the specifications without interactions and at the parent firm-level for the other specifications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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In order to identify the effect of home country employment protection more 
appropriately, we now report some alternative model specifications.  In order to save on space, 
these are all based on a definition of relocation as used in Table 3a (Definition 1).22  The models in 
Table 4 include the vector of control variables at the firm and home country level as discussed 
above.  The results show that the inclusion of these variables does not change our baseline 
findings on the importance of employment protection and its interaction with firm 
characteristics.   
In order to check whether industry-specific characteristics drive our results, we 
distinguish the manufacturing sector into high- and low-tech subsectors.  We present the results 
of re-estimating the models on the separate sub-samples in Tables 5 and 6 for low- and high-tech 
manufacturing sectors, respectively. Both tables show that the results on the importance of firm 
heterogeneity hold in both sub-sectors, albeit with some important differences.  We find in both 
sub-sectors negative and statistically significant effects of employment protection on the 
probability to relocate.  However, with regard to the importance of the firm-specific 
characteristics, we find some interesting differences.  
Starting with low tech manufacturing, it is the degree of labour intensity and the size of 
the firm −rather than productivity− that induces firms to relocate abroad. In other words, firms 
that are larger and more labour intensive are more likely to relocate.  This is consistent with the 
estimated coefficient for firms’ average wage level, indicating that firms with a higher average 
wage are more likely to relocate.  It is also in line with our theoretical model in which firms 
relocate in search of cheap labour and are therefore more likely to do so when they are relatively 
labour intensive.  Importantly, we find confirmation for our hypothesis that employment 
protection will hinder these larger and more labour-intensive firms more than their smaller and 
more capital intensive counterparts, as indicated by the significantly negative coefficient on the 
interaction term of employment protection and size and employment protection and labour 
intensity.  
The productivity coefficient is significant but has the opposite sign of what we expected.  
Here, the results in Table 3c may hint to a possible explanation for this.  When we consider 
Definition 3 of relocation (i.e., massive layoffs associated with relocation), the random effects 
panel probit estimates report a highly significant negative coefficient for the lagged relocation 
variable, indicating that firms that relocated massively in the previous period are less likely to 
relocate massively in the current period.  Thus, it is plausible that the most productive firms in 
low-tech manufacturing have been relocating earlier on and the ones that have been relocating 
later are the less productive ones (which would be in line with the fact that relocation has been 
ongoing in low-tech for quite a considerable time as the industry has been declining in the 
developed world). 
Turning to high tech manufacturing, we find that for these sectors productivity and size 
are crucial in determining the propensity to relocate. Clearly, the search for cheap labour is not 
                                                     
22 The results are consistent and similar when using Definition 2 and 3 in estimating tables 4, 5 and 6.  We report further 
robustness checks in Appendix Tables B2 and B3 to save on space. In Table B2 we use the growth rate of EPL rather than the 
level.  This allows us to look at within country changes in EPL over time.  We find that increasing EPL affects negatively on the 
probability of relocation.  In Table B3 we consider services sectors instead of manufacturing.  This can be interpreted as a 
placebo test, as we argue in the paper that we expect our mechanism to work in manufacturing.  We find that the link 
between EPL and relocation is less relevant in services, as expected.   
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the driving force for relocation for these firms, which is reflected in the fact that the coefficient on 
labour intensity and average wages are negative.  This suggests that, unlike in low tech 
manufacturing sectors, the type of labour hired by these firms is highly skilled and highly 
productive.  In fact, in contrast to low tech manufacturing, more productive, larger firms are 
significantly more likely to relocate while they are also the ones that are most hampered by 
employment protection, which is in line with what we expected (and perhaps also reflecting that, 
unlike in low tech manufacturing, massive relocation is a more recent phenomenon).   
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Table 4: Estimations with additional covariates 
  Probit Model (Marginal effects) Random Effects Panel Probit Model 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Relocation (t-1) 0.132*** 0.130*** 0.128*** 0.438*** 0.441*** 0.460*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.0520) (0.0523) (0.0539) 
Home l -0.015*** -0.037*** -0.030*** -0.166** -0.624*** -0.486*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.0743) (0.0682) (0.0523) 
Size 0.013***   0.265***   
 (0.002)   (0.0444)   
Size * Home l -0.003***   -0.0556***   
 (0.001)   (0.0104)   
Labour intensity  0.011***   0.239***  
  (0.003)   (0.0546)  
Labour intensity *Home l  -0.002***   -0.0430***  
  (0.001)   (0.0130)  
TFP   -5.04e-05**   -0.000791 
   (2.02e-05)   (0.000522) 
TFP * Home l   1.16e-05***   0.000181 
   (4.29e-06)   (0.000111) 
Home tax rate 0.052*** 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.879*** 0.972*** 0.981*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.318) (0.317) (0.328) 
Intangible to Total Assets 0.018** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.357** 0.538*** 0.514*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.180) (0.177) (0.180) 
Average Wage 3.86e-08 2.38e-07 -1.06e-07 -6.80e-06 -8.89e-07 -6.14e-06 
 (6.09e-07) (5.51e-07) (5.13e-07) (1.85e-05) (1.68e-05) (1.97e-05) 
Predicted probability 0.028 0.028 0.027    
Wald chi2 2,494.40 2,408.92 2,427.29 1,020.09 1,015.92 1,014.84 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.107 0.106 0.111    
Log pseudolikelihood -9,235.699 -9,131.732 -8,502.499 -9,136.2052 -9,036.2858 -8,424.5042 
Observations 62,052 61,554 57,927 61,861 61,366 57,800 
Notes: Coefficients are shown as marginal effects. All explanatory variables are lagged one period. All specifications include a full set of year, industry and country dummies and  
destinations - year pair fixed effects. Clustered standard errors are shown in parenthesis and at the parent country level for the specifications without interactions and at the parent 
firm-level for the other specifications. ; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
KIEL WORKING PAPER NO. 2102 | MARCH 2018 
 
19 
19 
 
 
Table 5: Low-technology sector 
  Probit Model (Marginal effects) Random Effects Panel Probit Model 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Relocation (t-1) 0.119*** 0.115*** 0.113*** 0.263*** 0.264*** 0.278*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.0729) (0.0736) (0.0768) 
Home l -0.017** -0.052*** -0.031*** -0.115 -0.836*** -0.438*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.103) (0.102) (0.0717) 
Size 0.011***   0.258***   
 (0.003)   (0.0609)   
Size * Home l -0.003***   -0.0572***   
 (0.001)   (0.0144)   
Labour intensity  0.029***   0.576***  
  (0.004)   (0.0869)  
Labour intensity *Home l  -0.006***   -0.111***  
  (0.001)   (0.0203)  
TFP   -8.20e-05***   -0.00147** 
   (2.74e-05)   (0.000632) 
TFP * Home l   1.78e-05***   0.000317** 
   (5.54e-06)   (0.000134) 
Home tax rate 0.073*** 0.077*** 0.074*** 1.132*** 1.284*** 1.190*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.417) (0.418) (0.429) 
Intangible to Total Assets 0.005 0.022* 0.014 0.120 0.398 0.308 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.298) (0.293) (0.301) 
Average Wage 7.68e-06*** 9.42e-06*** 7.52e-06*** 0.000124*** 0.000170*** 0.000141** 
 (2.47e-06) (2.47e-06) (2.59e-06) (4.80e-05) (4.89e-05) (5.89e-05) 
Predicted probability 0.030 0.030 0.030    
Wald chi2 1,309.74 1,346.66 1,306.43 475.44 516.00 468.83 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.101 0.107 0.106    
Log pseudolikelihood -4,966.972 -4,883.143 -4,477.742 -4,435.795 -4,829.0268 -4,904.2686 
Observations 32,162 31,897 29,455 30,053 32,202 32,472 
Notes: Coefficients are shown as marginal effects. All explanatory variables are lagged one period. All specifications include a full set of year, industry and country dummies and destinations - 
year pair fixed effects. Clustered standard errors are shown in parenthesis and at the parent country level for the specifications without interactions and at the parent firm-level for the other 
specifications. ; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table 6: High-technology sector 
  Probit Model (Marginal effects) Random Effects Panel Probit Model 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Relocation (t-1) 0.122*** 0.120*** 0.127*** 0.698*** 0.690*** 0.716*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.0740) (0.0745) (0.0771) 
Home l -0.008* -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.200* -0.464*** -0.446*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.115) (0.102) (0.0855) 
Size 0.011***   0.283***   
 (0.003)   (0.0682)   
Size * Home l -0.002***   -0.0568***   
 (0.001)   (0.0159)   
Labour intensity  -0.004   -0.0414  
  (0.003)   (0.0802)  
Labour intensity *Home l  0.001   0.0128  
  (0.001)   (0.0192)  
TFP   7.43e-05**   0.00232** 
   (3.16e-05)   (0.00106) 
TFP * Home l   -1.49e-05**   -0.000474** 
   (6.91e-06)   (0.000232) 
Home tax rate 0.015 0.012 0.018 0.660 0.628 0.892 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.589) (0.590) (0.612) 
Intangible to Total Assets 0.020** 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.485** 0.594*** 0.650*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.228) (0.226) (0.231) 
Average Wage -1.54-05** -1.55e-04** -3.44-04*** -0.00494*** -0.00483*** -0.0108*** 
 (4.21e-05) (4.20e-05) (3.67e-05) (0.00100) (0.00103) (0.00147) 
Predicted probability 0.039 0.039 0.039    
Wald chi2 1,574.950 1,551.74 1,514.780 743.53 729.99 750.61 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.148 0.143 0.152    
Log pseudolikelihood -4,065.768 -4,023.092 -3,805.453 -3,840.134 -4056.391 -4,100.501 
Observations 28,759 28,532 26,822 27,747 29,164 29,389 
Notes: Coefficients are shown as marginal effects. All explanatory variables are lagged one period. All specifications include a full set of year, industry and country dummies and destinations - 
year pair fixed effects. Clustered standard errors are shown in parenthesis and at the parent country level for the specifications without interactions and at the parent firm-level for the other 
specifications. ; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
KIEL WORKING PAPER NO. 2102 | MARCH 2018 
 
21 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper examines the determinants of the decision to relocate activities abroad for MNEs that 
are located in 28 OECD countries.  Particular attention is paid to home-country employment 
protection as a barrier to exit.  For high and low-tech manufacturing sectors we find that stricter 
employment protection in the home country discourages firms’ relocation.  Highly labour 
intensive firms in low-skill manufacturing and large, highly productive firms in high-skill 
manufacturing have, ceteris paribus, higher propensities to relocate.  Precisely these firms are, as 
suggested by our theoretical framework, hampered most in their relocation decisions by home 
country employment protection.   
Overall, our theoretical and empirical analysis suggests that the relationship between 
labour market rigidities and FDI is more complex than generally postulated in the literature.  In 
particular, we show that employment protection in the current country of location matters, while 
most earlier work focuses on what happens in the prospective host country.  From a policy point 
of view, our results suggest that countries with strict employment protection may be in a stronger 
position to slow down the exit of large, productive and highly labour intensive firms than their 
counterparts with lax employment protection laws.  This may be a blessing or a curse.  Hindering 
firms to relocate abroad prevents them from enjoying the benefits of such relocation in terms of 
better productivity or competitiveness.  However, there may undoubtedly also be social 
adjustment costs that are potentially associated with industry relocation. 
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APPENDIX A – THEORETICAL APPENDIX  
(i)  Deriving optimal outputs 
The optimal period-two output level when the firm decides to relocate to F, obtained from 
maximising expression (4a) with respect to Fq2 , is given by: 
 
2/][ 22
FF caq −=          (A.1a) 
 
while the optimal period-two output when the firm decides to stay in H is obtained from 
maximising expression (4b) with respect to Hq2  and is: 
 
2/][2 l
HHH Icaq αl+−=                   (A.1b) 
 
 Using expressions (A.1a) and (A.1b), the relocation condition (expression (3)) becomes: 
 
H
l
HF
l
HHF qIaIcaca 1
22
2 )1(4/])()[( αll −+F>+−−− .    (A.2) 
 
The firm determines its optimal period-one output level by maximising expected profit ( πE ), 
with: 
 
),()1(),( 2122121 FHHHE πρρπππ −++=       (A.3) 
 
and HH qcp 111 )( −=π .  Maximising expression (A.3) with respect to 
Hq1  yields: 
 
2/])1([1 l
H
l
HHH Icaq αρlαlρ −−−−= .      (A.4) 
 
From (A.4) and (A.1b), HH qq 21 <  follows; hence 0=I  in (A.1b), (A.2) and (A.4).  Expression 
(A.6) shows that the firm takes into account that it may want to relocate in period two by 
restricting its period-one output somewhat (reflected by 2/)1( l
Hαlρ−−  ) in order to limit 
future exit costs in case of relocation.23 
 
(ii) Comparative statics 
Using comparative statics, we examine how a firm’s propensity to relocate is affected by a 
change in firm size, productivity and labour intensity.  Define HH caA −≡  and 
HFF AcaA θ=−≡ 22  with 1>θ   (since 
HF cc <2 , and hence  
HF AA >2 , is a necessary condition 
for relocation).  HA  can be interpreted as a determinant of firm size.  Also, since HA  is inversely 
related to the average variable cost of production, HA could, alternatively, be viewed as an 
indicator of firm productivity.  Using HF AA θ=2 , the derivative of the left-hand side of 
expression (5) with respect to HA  is equal to 0)1](2/[ 2 >−θHA .  So, when 0=Hl , larger 
−more productive− firms have a higher propensity to relocate.  However, when 0>Hl , the 
                                                     
23 We have 0/)( 1 >
HH
l
H dqd lαl  provided that the probability of relocation is not too high compared to the first-period 
output of the firm (i.e., l
HHca αlρ 2/)(1 −<− ).  We assume this to be the case to ensure the firm wanted to produce in H 
as its initial location. 
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propensity to relocate of firms located in H will be lower.  With I=0 in expression (5), EPL-
induced exit costs are represented by Hl
H q1αl .  We have 02//)( 1 >= l
HHH
l
H dAqd αlαl .  So, 
ceteris paribus, larger and more productive firms have higher exit costs from a country with high 
employment protection than their smaller and less productive counterparts, which mitigate their 
relatively higher potential gains from relocation.  It suggests that employment protection tends to 
narrow the differences in the propensity to relocate between large and small firms and between 
very productive and less productive firms. 
 Next, we look at the effect of labour intensity on a firm’s propensity to relocate.  To isolate 
the labour intensity from the firm productivity effect, we compare the propensity to relocate for 
home firms that are equally productive, or, have the same marginal production costs ( Hc ) −and, 
in our model, thus have the same size, HA −, but operate with different relative labour intensities 
(denoted by klkl αα // = ).  An increase in firm-specific labour intensity that leaves 
Hc  
unaffected means 0)/(/ =+= Hlk
H
l
H rddwddc ααα , which in turn implies 
HH
lk rwdd // −=αα .  We first determine how such an increase in relative labour intensity of 
the firm affects its potential gains from relocation.  Differentiating the left-hand side of the 
inequality in expression (5) with respect to lα  (while keeping 
Hc  constant) yields 
2/)]/([ 22
HHFFF rwrwA −− .  Since HHFF rwrw //2 < , we have 0)/(2 <−
HHFF rwrw , and 
thus 02/)]/([ 22 >−−
HHFFF rwrwA , meaning that the gain of relocation towards countries in 
which labour is relatively cheap is higher for more labour intensive firms.  But, employment 
protection in the country from where the firm considers relocation raises exit costs ( Hl
H q1αl ), 
which are higher the more labour intensive the firm is (i.e., the higher lα ).  So, among equally 
productive, equally-sized firms, we expect that highly labour-intensive firms gain most from 
relocation, while at the same time being hindered most in their relocation decision if they face 
high levels of employment protection in the country from which they consider relocation.  Thus, 
we expect that the difference in relocation propensity between firms with a high and a low labour 
intensity will be narrowed by employment protection. 
 
 
 
  
KIEL WORKING PAPER NO. 2102 | MARCH 2018 
 
26 
 
APPENDIX B – EMPIRICAL APPENDIX 
 
Variable definitions: 
 
Firm size is measured using the natural logarithm of employees (Source: ORBIS) 
 
Home l is the Employment protection index observed in the source country (Source: World 
Economic Forum)  
 
Labour intensity is measured as the natural logarithm of the ratio of labour to capital, where 
capital is measured by fixed assets (Source: ORBIS) 
 
Average Wage is calculated by dividing a firm’s total wage bill by the number of employees 
(Source: ORBIS) 
 
Total factor productivity estimated using the approach described in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)  
 
IATA is calculated as the ratio of intangible assets over total assets (Source: ORBIS) 
 
Rates of tax on income, profits and corporate gains (Source: World Economic Forum) 
 
 
  
KIEL WORKING PAPER NO. 2102 | MARCH 2018 
 
27 
 
Classification of manufacturing industries by level of technology intensity: 
 
Eurostat uses the following aggregation according to technological-intensity and based on NACE 
Rev. 1 at the 2-digit level. Table A1 shows this classification for the manufacturing sector related 
to high-technology and low-technology.  
 
 
Table B1:  Manufacturing industries by level of technology intensity 
Level of technology intensity NACE two digits code (Divisions)  
High-technology sectors Manufacture of office machinery and computers (30); 
Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment 
and apparatus(32); 
Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, 
watches and clocks (33) 
Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. (31); 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (34); 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products (24); 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. (29); 
Manufacture of other transport equipment (35) 
Low technology sectors Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear 
fuel (23); Manufacture of rubber and plastic products (25);  
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products (26); 
Manufacture of basic metals (27);  Manufacture of fabricated 
metal products, except machinery and equipment (28) 
Manufacture of food products and beverages (15);  
Manufacture of tobacco products (16); Manufacture of textiles 
(17); Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of 
fur (18); Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of 
luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear (19);   
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except 
furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting 
materials (20); Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products 
(21); Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 
(22);  
Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. (36) 
Recycling (37) 
Source: Eurostat (2014) 
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Table B2: Effect of EPL growth on Relocation 
 Probit Model 
(Marginal Effects) 
 1 2 3 4 
Relocation (t-1) 0.127*** 0.144*** 0.137*** 0.134*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) 
Change in Home l -0.015*** -0.054*** -0.092*** -0.030** 
 (0.005) (0.017) (0.024) (0.013) 
Size  0.001**   
  (0.00)   
Size * Home l  -0.007**   
  (0.003)   
Labour intensity   0.003***  
   (0.001)  
Labour intensity *Home l   -0.016***  
   (0.005)  
TFP    -2.76e-06 
    (4.42e-06) 
TFP * Home l    1.48e-05 
    (4.15e-05) 
Predicted probability 0.029 0.031 0.030 0.029 
Wald chi2 3036.51 2325.56 1,777.06 1,651.79 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.089 0.072 0.093 0.096 
Log pseudolikelihood -13,469.675 -13,742.469 -12,064.181 -10,984.684 
Observations 91,583 91,583 80,029 74,136 
Notes: Coefficients are shown as marginal effects.  All explanatory variables are lagged one period. All specifications 
include a full set of year, industry and country dummies and destination-time pair fixed effects. Clustered standard 
errors are shown in parenthesis and at the parent country level for the specifications without interactions and at the 
parent firm-level for the other specifications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B3: Services sector (NACE 50-74) 
 Probit Model 
(Marginal Effects) 
 1 2 3 4 
Relocation (t-1) 0.068*** 0.070*** 0.078*** 0.073*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.015) 
Home l 0.0004 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) 
Size  -0.0003   
  (0.001)   
Size * Home l  0.0004   
  (0.0003)   
Labour intensity   -0.002  
   (0.003)  
Labour intensity * Home l   0.001  
   (0.001)  
TFP    7.77e-08* 
    (4.42e-08) 
TFP * Home l    -2.55e-08* 
    (1.42e-08) 
Predicted probability 0.019 0.019 0.023 0.019 
Wald chi2 582.08 586.44 510.36 -514.67 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.077 0.079 0.073 0.076 
Log pseudolikelihood -3,704.654 -3,697.322 -2,991.97   -3037.51 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 32,691 32,691 23,745 26,686 
Notes: Coefficients are shown as marginal effects. All explanatory variables are lagged one period. All specifications include 
a full set of year, industry and country dummies. Clustered standard errors are shown in parenthesis and at the parent 
country level for the specifications without interactions and at the parent firm-level for the other specifications. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0. 
 
